Subject: EEE会議（Re: Re：日本核武装論）
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2003 14:50:12 +0900
From: "kkaneko" <kkaneko@eagle.ocn.ne.jp>

各位

日本核武装論に関する小生の意見（昨日のEEE会議）に対して、いくつかの反
応が海外から帰ってきています。主なものだけを次にご紹介します。ご参考ま
で。　（時間がないので、日本語の要約はできません。あしからず。）

金子熊夫拝

*****************************

Kumao-san's note is precisely to the point.

The Korean 'nuclear crisis' should lead to a reinforcement of the US-
Japan alliance. It is a complicated alliance, no doubt. But one worth
working hard to reinforce.

1) The US needs a strategic presence in Northeast Asia to help
maintain stability. The alliance with Japan is key: it provides the US
with bases; it tempers worries in Japan about potential enemies; it
tempers worries in the rest of the region about a rearmed Japan. It
works for everyone.

2) A Japan cut off from an alliance with the US would naturally feel a
need to build up its military. That would provoke enormous fears in
the region. Not a good a idea!

3) As years go by, Japanese will naturally feel a need and desire to
express themselves in the realm of security/military policy. The US
will have to adapt, and Japan will have to change. But the nuclear
element of the relation is the one that should not change. At the
end of the day, an attack on Japan -- or even a threat to Japan -- is
an attack/threat on the US.

The key to the US strategic position in Asia is the relationship with
Japan. And the key to the relationship with Japan is a clear US
commitment that the US will strategically defend Japan. To make
this relationship work in the long-term, both countries will have to
adapt. The US will have to accept a bigger alliance management
role from Tokyo. Japan will have to accept more responsibility for its
own defense, and for the defense of the international community.

This won't be easy to work out. But the current tension over the NK
nuclear program could be a catalyst for enhancement, rather than
the kind of 'alliance breaker' and a nuclear-armed Japan would likely
represent.

Peter Ennis

************************************

Peter Ennis makes some good points, as far as he goes, but I think
this time his focus is a bit too narrow and that he may be so locked
in on the doomsday scenario that he doesn't appreciate the
opportunities in the current embroglio with North Korea. The Bush
administration seems to me to be unlikely to be willing to accept a
solution that just restores the status quo ante with regard to the
agreed framework. They want a more far-reaching outcome. To get
that, the Chinese have to be much more vigorous and assertive with
the North Koreans than they have been heretofore. We seem
unlikely to be able to accomplish it on our own, though the
spectacle of the U.S. going through Iraq like grease through a
goose may have a salutary sobering effect north of the DMZ. I agree
that the U.S. shouldn't threaten to encourage Japan to go nuclear.
The Chinese wouldn't believe us if we said we were going to do that
anyhow. It is too much out of character, and contrary to our
interests. The good news is that the U.S. doesn't need to threaten
to do any such thing. Some elements in China are perfectly
capable, with a little judicious encouragement, of coming to the
conclusion entirely on their own that the Japanese are up to no
good. In this regard, the spectacle of past Japanese military
extravagances in response to rather benign events (creating an
independent, redundant, and totally unnecessary surveillance
capability, or trying to develop an independent space-launch
capability, come to mind) may easily lead the more militant
elements within China (can anyone say PLA?) to conclude (however
irrationally) that the Japanese are just untrustworthy enough to pull
something flakey like flirting with a nuclear option. If that in turn
leads them to pressure China's diplomatic establishment to rein in
the North Koreans, or if they take it into their heads to yank on the
reigns themselves, it wouldn't be such a bad thing, would it?
Meanwhile, we need to refrain from believing every threat of
bombardment that the North Koreans make, or we are just going to
paralyze ourselves. I've seen enough of how the North Koreans
operate to know that His Exhaulted Dear Leadership is probably
scared witless at this moment that his little Wizard of Oz display of
bellicosity is going to be revealed for the sham that it is. When
these guys are most bellicose is when they are most frightened. As
they say in the Hooters ad: Get a grip. With respect,
John Kelley

*********************************

I find comments like those of Senator McCain odd - I was under the
impression that it is not US opposition to Japanese nuclear arms
development that confines Japan, but its multilateral obligations,
under treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), not to
mention domestic political opposition. For the US to say that it
would actively support Japan's acquisition of nuclear arms would be
massively hypocritical when it seeks to enforce NPT on others.

Now on a practical basis, it is undoubtedly the existence of the US
nuclear umbrella and probably US pressure not to develop arms that
prevents Japan from deploying nuclear weapons. I believe that it is
widely acknowledged that Japan has the capability to produce
nuclear capable ballistic missiles equipped with such warheads -
but deployment of such would be seen as a crossing of the
Rubicon. From this perspective, it has to be assumed that for the
Chinese, even tacit support for further theoretical work on nuclear
weapons deployment by the Japanese would represent a threat.
(and thus a lever for work on the DPRK) I assume it would have to
be this kind of tacit support that the US would be threatening to
offer to Japan, rather than urging it to break its international
treaty
obligations.

Ken Okamura