Subject: ＥＥＥ会議（イラク攻撃問題：「石油の枢軸」）
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2003 23:48:47 +0900
From: "金子　熊夫" <kkaneko@eagle.ocn.ne.jp>

各位

米国によるイラク攻撃はあるのかないのか、あるとすれば何時なのか、今もって不明
ですが、もし攻撃が実際に行われ、戦闘が長引けば、最悪の場合石油は１バレル５０
ドルに高騰する可能性もあり、これにヴェネズエラ石油の供給停止が重なれば、米国
経済は大打撃を受ける惧れがある、だから一層の石油消費量の削減と新規エネルギー
の開発が急務だが、同時に米国は、冷戦時代の敵国であるロシア、中国とこの際「石
油の枢軸同盟」を構築すべきだーーーと主張するのは、ＮｅｗＹｏｒｋＴｉｍｅｓの
社説です（１月２１日付け。詳細は以下のとおり）。　それにしても、輸入石油の中
東依存度が２０％以下の米国に比べ、依存度が９０％近い日本で、しかも東電の原発
１７基が全部ストップするかもしれないというこの時期に、未だにそれほどの危機感
が感じられないのは一体どういうことなのでしょうか。
金子熊夫
***************************************************
The Axis of Oil

ith all due respect to President Bush and Congressional Democrats, this
month's most notable stimulus plan for the American economy did not emanate
from Washington but from Vienna. The recent decision by the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries to provide an additional 1.5 million
barrels a day to world markets should help make up for the shutdown of
Venezuela's oil industry, the source of 13 percent of America's imports. The
move also signals Saudi Arabia's willingness to ensure the flow of
affordable crude in the event of war with Iraq.

Beyond its immediate benefits, the Saudi decision is a further reminder of
how closely our fortunes are tied to the good offices of the big producers
three decades after the oil shocks of the 1970's. That the Saudis and other
Middle East producers have had to come to America's rescue in the wake of
Venezuela's political crisis is rich in irony. Venezuela was counted on as a
buffer against disruptions in deliveries from the Persian Gulf.

America's current predicament ・it confronts the possibility of losing both
Venezuelan and Iraqi oil at the same time ・is thus instructive on two
counts. It provides another powerful incentive, if any more were needed, to
tighten fuel efficiency standards and to push more aggressively for the
long-term development of alternative fuels. Since the United States has less
than 3 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, the only sure road to
greater self-sufficiency is through reduced consumption and new technology.

The other lesson is that the importance to the global economy of the big
Persian Gulf suppliers, especially the Saudis, has not been diminished,
however much we like to regard ourselves as "buffered" by Mexico, Venezuela
or even Russia and the other former Soviet republics. Like it or not, the
Saudis retain as much leverage as they ever have over global energy markets.
Their share of current output may have declined, but the Persian Gulf area
still claims two-thirds of the world's known reserves. And because it
commands the bulk of the world's spare capacity in the near term, Saudi
Arabia acts as a central banker when it comes to oil, determining the
market's liquidity.

For now, at least, OPEC is helpfully trying to keep prices between $22 and
$28 a barrel. It knows that allowing prices to hover above the $30 mark
hampers global economic growth. But given America's thirst, even the cartel
cannot fully ensure our economic recovery in light of the great uncertainty
Venezuela and the Iraqi crisis create for energy markets. Fuel costs affect
vast swaths of the economy, so at a time when it's anyone's guess whether
oil will cost $20 or $60 a barrel six months from now, too many businesses
are simply putting off any spending decisions.

If war is averted, oil prices are sure to decline, perhaps dramatically once
Venezuela's crisis is resolved. A quick war that knocks Iraq's two million
daily barrels off the market for a time could result in a short-term spike
in prices, followed by a steep decline as Iraq, home to the world's
second-largest reserves, increases production afterward. A protracted
conflict in which Iraq attacks its neighbors' oilfields would be likely to
trigger another economic recession, with oil prices exceeding $50 a barrel.

This isn't solely of concern to the West. China, with its mounting need for
Middle East oil to fuel its economic growth, stands to lose as much as
anyone. The fact that this once self-sufficient energy consumer will soon
become the world's second-largest oil importer is creating an affinity of
interests between Washington and Beijing, much as it does between Moscow and
Beijing.

One positive aspect of the current uncertainty is that it reinforces the
need for Washington and its cold-war adversaries ・Russia and China ・to
work closely together on energy policy. At home, it should also prod the
Bush administration to address sensible measures to encourage efficiency.