Subject: EEE会議（北朝鮮核開発とKEDOの存亡）
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2003 16:46:49 +0900
From: "kkaneko" <kkaneko@eagle.ocn.ne.jp>

各位殿

北朝鮮と米国は、１０年前の北朝鮮核危機の際、北の核開発を凍結する見返りとして
軽水炉２基（各１００キロワット）を提供する、それが完成するまでの間米国が原油
を
毎年５０万トン提供するという内容の米朝枠組み合意（１９９４年ジュネーヴで調
印）を
結びました。この合意に基づき、米、韓国、日本等による「朝鮮半島エネルギー開発
機構」（KEDO)が結成され、約束どおり軽水炉２基の建設作業を進めてきました。

ところが、北朝鮮を「悪の枢軸」と呼ぶブッシュ政権になって米国が重油の提供を
ストップしたことなどから、北朝鮮は１９９４年の枠組み合意を米側が破ったとし
て、
昨年秋以来、核開発計画の凍結を解除するほか、新たに高濃縮ウランによる核兵器
開発の存在を公認するなど一連の「瀬戸際政策」をとり始めたわけです。一方、日韓
両国政府は、他に「北」の暴走を防ぐ妙案がないこともあり、KEDO体制は依然有効と
いう立場をとっているようです。

しかし、軽水炉建設計画は事実上停止状態にあり、KEDO自体が風前のともし火で、
このままでは歯止めがなくなった「北」が次にどんな暴挙に出るか予断を許しませ
ん。
目下世界中の関心はイラク戦争に集中していますが、私たち北東アジアの住人として
は、
北朝鮮問題への目配りを一時も怠るわけには行きません。

実は小生が参加している米国のあるEメール会議（日米関係や北東アジア安全保障
問題が主題）でも、最近KEDO問題が盛んに議論されております。　以下に、その関連
メールをいくつかご紹介します。

ここで問題になっているのは、（１）北朝鮮のエネルギー電力事情（送配電網も含
め）に
照らせば、１００万キロワット軽水炉２基を供与するというKEDO構想は最初から不適
切で
あったのではないか、（２）そもそも、この構想は１９９４年に訪朝し金日成と会談
したカー
ター元大統領の思いつきに過ぎなかったのではないか（カーター氏自身原子力の大専
門
家である）、（３）日本政府がそのことを十分知りつつKEDOに同調したとすれば、不
見識
だったのではないか（どうせ援助するなら水力か火力発電所にすべきだった）、
（４）１００
万キロワット軽水炉１基で北朝鮮の電力需要の何％くらいを賄えると考えていたか、
（５）
原子炉の建設以外に送配電網の建設・整備も当初経費に計上されていたのか、別途の
予算だとすれば、どのくらいかかりそうなのか、（６）今後KEDOはどうなるのか？も
し中途
で放棄となれば、その後はどうなるのか、というようなことです。

つきましては、当EEE会議でも、これらの問題点について議論したいと存じますの
で、
それぞれの立場で何か意見、提案や関連情報等をお持ちの方はこの際是非積極的に
開陳してください。

金子熊夫拝
********************************************

�@
KEDO, as I think most readers of this forum know , is the energy
development consortium of Japan, the USA and South Korea that is
building a nuclear reactor in North Korea financed by Japan and
being built by South Korea. The USA's contribution is 500,000 tons
of heavy oil per year until the reactor is finished, a contribution that
the USA recently cut off on discovery of North Korean violations of
the 1994 agreement between North Korea and the USA.

The reactor that KEDO is building is 2000 megawatt, which would
be large enough to supply electricity to about 200,000 homes in
Japan. This construction continues.

Today, while doing other research I came across comments that
strongly suggest North Korea's electrical grid is in such bad repair
that North Korea will not be able to use the electricity that the react
or generates when it comes on line. Also, and this is perhaps less
well known, in 2000, there was a Japanese mission composed of
three electric transmission experts that visited North Korea and
surveyed its transmission capacities for about three months. They
claim that North Korean electricity generating capacity is less than
30% of demand, and that a minimum of 20%
of this is lost in transmission.

Could we be looking at another manifestation of the Japanese
government's habit of building super highways to nowhere, three
bridges when one will do and airports nobody can afford to land at in
the guise of KEDO? I recall a very similar set of accusations about
the diesel power generator on one of the Northern Territory islands.

W.T.Stonehill

****************************************************

�A
A quick response to Mr. William T. Stonehill's question put forth in
the last paragraph of his otherwise sensible posting:

The Japanese decision to pay its share of money necessary for
building two nuclear reactors under the aegis of KEDO was made
reluctantly in the absence of a better alternative at that time--and
obviously under the strong coercion from Washington--to implement
the 1994 Framework Agreement between the United States and
North Korea. Incidentally the idea of giving North Koreans two light-
water reactors in exchange of their graphite reactors was originally
President Jimmy Carter's, who himself is a great expert of nuclear
technology (his expertise was developed as a young Navy officer
under Admiral Hyman Rickover, the father of nuclear submarines).

With my high respect to President Carter, I have always doubted
the wisdom of that "nuclear deal" under the 1994 Framework
Agreement and had little sympathy with it, realizing as much as I
did the real nuclear ambitions of North Korea (I happened to be the
director of the Nuclear Energy Division of the Gaimusho in 1970s-
80s).

Therefore, I have no intention to defend my government from its
responsibility for supporting the 1994 Agreement even under
inevitable circumstances. But I can hardly accept Mr. Stonehill's
insinuation by drawing naive similarities between Japan's poor
construction policies and its participation in the KEDO
arrangements. Similarities, if any, exist only in the lack of realistic
cost/benefit assessment in both cases. Moreover, he may as well
remember that more than three quarters of the fund for two LWRs is
to be paid by the South Korean government.

Kumao Kaneko, Tokyo

*************************************************

�B （Addressed to Prof. K. Kaneko)
Thank you for the interesting and useful response. I now realize that
this is a disaster about to happen made in Foggy Bottom
(Washington DC) rather than Kasumigaseki, despite the surface
resemblance to Japan's poor construction policies.

You may be curious to learn that Mr. Carter's university degree was
in nuclear engineering. He is, as you point out, truly an expert on
nuclear technology. From what Stanley Chan has written, we might
also hypothesize that Mr. Carter (who was probably aware of how
bad the North Korean electrical grid is) probably had in mind a two
or three step process. The first step being the construction of
reactors, the second step the repair of the immediate grid around
the reactors, and the final step the repair and modernization of the
entire North Korean grid.

Let me point out again, that the reactors being built are very small
scale, unless my information is incorrect. I would appreciate
hearing from someone with more detailed information. As I
understand it, they are 2000 Megawatts, which is about the energy
required by 200,000 Japanese homes. When you consider that
Pyongyang itself had a population above 2.5 million, it's clear that
the two light water reactors will not go very far to solve North
Korea's crucial electricity problems. I have also heard that recently
the Korean head of KEDO has suggested that work on the
reactors be halted and the money instead put into a series of
smaller coal/oil generators.

This brings us in turn to the implications of what is going on at
Yongbang, and what it means to Japan. It is difficult indeed for me
to accept that Yongbang has been started for electricity generation,
given how bad North Korea's grid seems to be. It seems to me that
the level of threat implied is a very high seriousness and that there
is indeed a growing threat to Japan. I would like to ask how other
forum members see the starting up of the reactor at Yongbang, and
also what they think the immediate short term effects will be on
Japan, and in particular, what moves Japan can make, either with or
without its' usual historical allies, to resolve this situation.

W.T.Stonehill
******************************************

�C
The KEDO deal, had it lasted and gone the way North Korea ideally
wanted, it probably wasn't really going to be a highway-to-nowhere
style Japanese infrastructure project.

In all likelihood, looking at North Korea's negotiating tactics, and
tendency to ask for increasing food & economic aid over time [and
usually getting it], Pyongyang would have eventually asked for
additional aid to upgrade the North Korean power grid.

After all -- what good are two nuclear reactors if you can't actually
use the electricity they produce.

And how could we say "No" to an additional project to upgrade the
power grid? Theoretically, the North Koreans could come back and
say, "Ha, you cheated us, you built us a bunch of useless nuclear
reactors! You negotiated in bad faith!"

And chances are -- had things continued on the same path ---
upgrading the North Korean power grid would become the next big
project for Japan/ROK/US. The very fact you had Japanese
technical people examining North Korea's power grid indicates that
there was some serious desire [at least in some quarters] to make
the reactors useful for civilian power generation.

Even if the reactors weren't that useful, and an upgraded electrical
grid were not built, defenders of the deal would argue that the
symbolism is what matters. The fact that the US, Japan, South
Korea, were willing to spend billions to build a nuclear reactor for
the DPRK was a strong signal that none of the three parties had
hostile intent to the DPRK.

There is some truth to that, theoretically nobody would want to
spend billions building a nuclear reactors for a country they would
intend to destroy.

But then again -- this opens up the whole issue of whether or not
Washington/Tokyo should subsidize Kim Jong Il. If you can
imagine a spoiled & demanding child, then imagine a spoiled and
demanding child with guns. That's Kim Jong Il.

Stan Chan