Subject: EEE会議（Re:北朝鮮核問題をどう考えるか？）
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2003 09:02:12 +0900
From: "kkaneko" <kkaneko@eagle.ocn.ne.jp>

各位殿

北朝鮮核問題の解決を困難にしている原因の１つは、そもそも何故北が核兵器やミサ
イル開発をするのかという動機や狙いが（我々にとって）はっきりしないことだと思
います。　すなわち北は、（１）米国に対する当面の抑止力ないし交渉カードとして
核開発をしているのか（比較的短期的な狙い）、あるいは（２）核兵器やミサイルを
自国防衛のための手段として、と同時にそれらを輸出して外貨を稼ぐための手段とし
て開発しているのか（比較的長期的な狙い）。　おそらく北は両方を狙っているので
しょう。　もし（１）だけなら、例えば米朝不可侵条約の締結（北が最も欲している
もの）などによって解決できる可能性がありますが、（２）となると厄介です。　日
米としては、とりあえずは（１）の段階に留めさせる工夫をすべきでしょうが、肝心
の韓国の腹が読めません。一方、米国や日本には、この際一気に北を潰してしまえと
いうタカ派論者、逆にKEDOなどをできるだけ存続させて北との話し合いによる解決を
図れというハト派論者も結構いるわけで、今後、イラク戦争の推移を睨みながら、対
北朝鮮戦略を再構築する必要があると思います。

実は、こうした議論が、ある国際的Eメール会議で進行中です。一昨日その一部
（KEDOに関する議論）をご紹介しましたが、以下、その続きです。ご参考まで。　皆
様のご意見をお聞かせください。
金子熊夫
*****************************************

Mr. Stonehill is right to question whether or not the activity at
Yongbyon can be justified in terms of power generation, but we
don't need to ponder the question very long. I think almost everyone
familiar with the issue would say that what little power can be
generated and distributed from Yongbyon is not worth the effort
(time, money, manpower) the North Koreans are putting into the
place. They can get better energy bang for the buck via other
activities. The goal seems to be a nuclear weapons program...but
here is the crux of the problem...

Is the purpose of the program (1) to develop a short-term deterrent /
mid to long-term bargaining chip, or (2) is it meant to be a long-term
deterrent and source of income via proliferation? American and
Japanese officials (together with the South Koreans, of course)
need to consult extensively about how they would handle both
scenarios. They are, in fact, doing this as we discuss on the
Forum. They also need a cohesive strategy for how to convince
North Korea to shift from scenario "2" to scenario 1, if necessary.

A key challenge is the fact that scenario 2 doesn't bother the South
Koreans anywhere near as much as it bothers the US (or even
Japan). The US-Japan security relationship is tightening as a
result...while the US-ROK relationship is loosely flapping around the
edges (not unraveling yet...but it needs some mending and
attention).

The government officials involved in this work have better access to
info than I do, and they don't need me to suggest a strategy (but I'll
offer one anyway, in the spirit of the Forum). I think it is prudent to
assume the North Korean goal is scenario 2, but the first option for
dealing with this problem needs to be a collective, concerted effort
to convince the North Koreans that scenario 1 is a far better
approach for their country and their people. Then we can try to
negotiate away the program by allaying their fears and satisfying
our critics. I don't believe that it would be giving into "blackmail" to
initiate dialogue with the North Koreans (bilateral, multilateral, some
combination, etc.) to better ascertain motives, intentions, options
and solutions. We have to get rid of that nuclear program, and we
have to try everything to accomplish that peacefully. It might not
work, but we have to try.

The US and Japan have an opportunity to strengthen their
relationship and cooperation on the one foreign policy issue that
has a top priority for both of us. US-Japan solidarity is helping our
cause right now. But there is still too big of a gap between many in
the ROK government and some hardliners in Washington (and a few
in Tokyo). The three countries need to bridge this gap before we
can work together effectively to solve the problem.

Jim Schoff,
New York, US-Japan Foundation