Subject: EEE会議（Re:　"Atoms for Peace”５０周年会議）
Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2003 08:21:14 +0900
From: "kkaneko" <kkaneko@eagle.ocn.ne.jp>

各位殿

先日（３月３０日）お知らせしましたように、本年は、アイゼンハワー大統領の歴史
的な「平和のための原子力」(Atoms for Peace)演説（１９５３年１２月８日）から
５０年周年で、世界各国で各種の記念行事が予定されております。その皮切りに米国
カリフォルニア州のローレンス・リバーモア国立研究所（LLNL)で４月８−１０日、
国際専門家会議が開催され、小生もパネリストとして出席しますが、同会議での議論
のための「問題点リスト」の追加分が主催者から送られて来ましたので、ご参考まで
に高覧に供します（最初の「問題点リスト」は先日お目にかけました）。

実は、当EEE会議でも同趣旨のシンポジウムのようなものを本年末あたりに東京で開
催し、日本の原子力平和利用と核問題の来し方行く末を大いに議論したいと考えてお
りますが、このリストはその意味でも大いに参考になるのではないかと存じます。

とくに、日本人パネリスト（金子）に向けられた質問の中に「日本核武装論」が含ま
れていること、核拡散はいまや防止不可能な問題となってしまったとの認識が米側主
催者の前提となっているとみられること等が注目されるところです。皆様のご意見、
ご感想をどしどしお聞かせください。

金子熊夫

***************************************************

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE PANELISTS

　　How did we get here and what did we learn along the way?


1. It has often been noted that the scientific evolution of the peaceful
applications of nuclear energy has been stunted by extraordinary government
measures to proscribe the path by which the technology would evolve. This
approach stands in stark contrast to other technologies that benefited from
early government sponsorship such as computers, aircraft, communications
satellites, etc. and benefited even more from liberalization. As a result,
civil nuclear power policy remains frozen in time, locked into an
international policy and regulatory apparatus that has protected high-cost,
proliferation-prone nuclear technology from the process of scientific
innovation and economic renewal. How can scientific innovation and economic
rationality be reintroduced into the development of civil applications of
nuclear energy in the 21st century?

2. A number of regional security problems have proven to be intractable,
refusing to yield to non-nuclear approaches to regional security and
stability. In the process, several of the affected States concluded that
nuclear weapons offer the best alternative to meet their security needs.
Can international security policy be altered in a manner that provides more
satisfactory choices, or in extremis, dissuade nations from making such a
choice?

3. A hypothesis that animated post-World War II public policy was that
nuclear weapons proliferation per se increased the likelihood of their use,
and hence had to be prevented through the creation and enforcement of
international norms. Evidence does not sustain this hypothesis. The
Rumsfeld Commission on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
(1998) affirmed the view that preventing access to nuclear weapons
technology to any nation seeking it was no longer an attainable public
policy aspiration. How should 21st century public policy be adjusted to
reflect these conditions?

4. Has US policy on publishing information on nuclear weapons (unique among
nuclear weapon states) physics, engineering, design, manufacturing, effects,
support, and employment facilitated nuclear proliferation?

5. Is deterrence a relevant concept for the mitigation of the consequences
of nuclear proliferation in the 21st century?

6. In between 1945 and the 1980s, the long-range delivery of nuclear
weapons was the most costly approach to deterring aggression. In less than
a generation, the acquisition of nuclear weapons has become the preferred
approach to security for nations who are among the poorest on earth. What
are the long-term consequences of this change in the economics of security？

Question for a non-nuclear state participant (e.g. Japan)


Many states (Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, Brazil, etc.) decided not to
develop nuclear weapons or dismantled existing programs. How have recent
events - especially Iraq and September 11 - affected nations' restraint
calculations?

Question for a nuclear-capable state, non-party to the NPT (e.g. India)


Although the US and the former USSR had many thousands of nuclear weapons
during the Cold War, the significant fact is that not one was used. Isn't
the non-use of nuclear weapons the real issue, not their possession?
Wouldn't it be better to recognize that some states will acquire nuclear
weapons regardless of attempts to prevent that from happening, so what we
really should do is establish agreements or other structures that would
lessen the probability of their use?