送信者: "Kumao KANEKO" <kkaneko@eeecom.jp>
件名 : ＥＥＥ会議（リスクと現実：原発のテロ対策）
日時 : 2003年5月20日 19:34

各位殿
　
ついでにもう一つ、原子力発電所とテロ攻撃の問題に関する米国の情報です。　
ニューヨーク市の直ぐ北にあるインディアン・ポイント原発について、連邦緊急事態
管理庁（FEMA）の元長官が中心になって纏めた報告書――同原発のテロ対策は不十分
で、もしテロ攻撃に遭ったら大量の放射能（放射線）が大気中に拡散して住民に多大
の被害が生ずるのを防げない、云々――が発表されたところ、これに対して早速専門
家から、同報告書は著しく科学的根拠を欠く（状況によって大量に拡散するとは限ら
ない）、テロ攻撃の対象は原発以外にも沢山ある、等という厳しい反論が寄せられて
いるようです。本日のNY Timesの寄稿論文もその１つで、筆者は元エネルギー省緊急
事態委員会の委員長で、上記原発の安全審査も担当した由。ご参考まで。
金子熊夫

**************************************
Nuclear Risk and Reality
By HERSCHEL SPECTER


he thinking goes like this: if terrorists attacked the Indian Point nuclear
power plant in Westchester County, just north of New York, hundreds of
thousands of people within a 10-mile radius would need to be evacuated. A
state report on emergency planning at Indian Point, prepared by James Lee
Witt, the former director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
concluded that current emergency plans were inadequate and warned that they
could not protect the public from a large release of radioactive material.
Opponents of Indian Point immediately latched on to the report as further
reason to close the plant.

As an independent consultant who has reviewed emergency planning for
Entergy, which owns Indian Point, I believe that the Witt report is strong
on process, but weak on science. The report is correct that communications
is essential to disaster management and that public education about
emergency planning has been poor. However, its conclusion that a terrorist
attack on Indian Point renders its emergency plan unworkable has no
scientific basis.

Perhaps we need to review what terrorists can and cannot do. Let's make the
very unlikely assumption that terrorists overcome all the security forces
and cause every safety system to fail, leading to plant damage. First, we
should understand that there is a finite amount of radioactive material at
these plants. No terrorist can increase this inventory.

Second, not all of this material would escape into the environment. Natural
forces cause radioactive material to stick to various surfaces, to fall
quickly to the ground, or to form soluble salts that remain largely in
place. Terrorists can do nothing to eliminate these natural forces. Other
natural forces come into play once the remaining radioactive material is
carried from the damaged plant by air currents. The resultant plume is
narrow, covering but a small percentage of the surrounding area.

No one outside the plume is at radiological risk. It hardly matters if large
numbers of people outside this narrow area do not seek shelter, fail to
evacuate or even get stuck in traffic: they are not at risk. Emergency
workers would not have to choose between their families and their duty; the
vast majority would be outside the affected area.

Other natural forces beyond the reach of terrorists would cause a
radioactive plume to weaken as it moves away from the plant. Typically, in
less than two miles, the plume is too weak to cause early fatalities. A few
miles further, and the plume is too weak to cause early injuries.

At worst, only about 10 percent of the 10-mile zone need be promptly
evacuated. More realistically, this prompt-evacuation area would be more
like 4 percent or 5 percent. Beyond this area, people would be well served
by staying inside until the very weak plume had passed. People in New York
City, some 35 miles south, would never have to evacuate promptly from any
terrorist attack at Indian Point.

The second line of defense against terrorists, after natural forces, is a
good communications system. (Once informed of the plume location, people can
take protective actions to significantly reduce their exposure.) The last
line of defense is the special assistance rendered by the emergency team.
Many alleged deficiencies in the emergency plan relate to this third line of
defense, but natural forces and good communications make them far less
significant.

Much of the fear about Indian Point is based on a fundamental misconception.
Not everyone in the plant's 10-mile zone must evacuate simultaneously. The
Witt report correctly notes that a balanced strategy of recommending that
some people stay inside while asking others to evacuate provides the best
protection for the public. Small-area evacuations mean that resource issues
also are small. The number of buses needed to transport school children, the
distribution of potassium iodide pills and so forth ・would be drastically
smaller than in a 10-mile evacuation.

Recently attention has turned to possible terrorist attacks on the Indian
Point spent-fuel pools, where old irradiated fuel is stored awaiting
eventual shipment off site. It has been shown that a direct crash of a large
commercial jet would not cause these reinforced concrete pools to fail. In
addition, it only takes a small water spray to protect the spent fuel rods.

The resources available to fight terrorism are finite. They must not be
squandered on nonthreatening issues driven by fear or opportunism. There is
an abundance of other potential terrorist targets containing hazardous
materials that pose a far greater risk and whose defenses are far less
robust.

We now face a serious choice. Should we continue this technically
unsupportable resistance to Indian Point at the expense of addressing other
terrorist risks, like a chlorine-based water-treatment facility in
Westchester County? Or should Entergy and the counties surrounding the plant
work together to fix the minor shortcomings in the Indian Point emergency
plan? Let's hope those concerned allow knowledge to win over fear.


Herschel Specter, chairman of a Department of Energy committee on emergency
planning in 1984, was the federal regulator in charge of reviewing the
licensing of Indian Point in the early 1970's