The Central Intelligence Agency confirmed this week that a scientist, Mahdi Obeidi, who headed Iraq's uranium enrichment program in the 1980's and early 1990's, had turned over some components of a gas centrifuge, a machine used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, as well as blueprints for building and operating such a device. He had been ordered by Saddam Hussein's son Qusay to bury the material in his rose garden in 1991.
The discovery reveals that the Hussein regime was willing to hide materials that it was supposed to disclose. The vast bulk of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure was destroyed by allied bombs during the 1991 gulf war or dismantled by international inspectors in the years immediately after, but nuclear expertise and plans are easier to hide than big machines.
Still, these newly discovered components and blueprints are a long way from an actual weapon. They are essentially templates that could be used to build the hundreds or thousands of centrifuges needed to produce bomb-grade uranium. It is comforting that even in recent years, when inspectors had been banned from Iraq and Western intelligence feared the worst, Mr. Obeidi was never told to dig up his buried treasures. Iraq's nuclear program was apparently in deep hibernation. The new discovery, then, falls far short of validating the Bush administration's pre-invasion claims that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.
The incident sends a mixed message about the challenges facing international inspections. On one hand, it is clear that inspectors would have very little chance of finding material buried in someone's backyard without a tip. On the other hand, if key scientists cooperate, they can point the way to clandestine activities. If Mr. Obeidi's example now encourages other Iraqi scientists to come forward, the world may get a better fix on whether Iraq's weapons program constituted a serious danger.