EEE会議(Re:原爆投下決定の正当性)....................................................................2003.8.7
広島、長崎原爆問題に関しては日米双方で考え方が大きく違うのは当然ですが、アメリカ人の言い分もそれなりに理解しておく必要はあると思います。次にご紹介するのは、今朝米国の知人から届いたばかりのメールですが、筆者は著名な学者論客で、原爆投下決定の背景をかなり客観的に分析しており、傾聴する値打ちはあると考えます。メールの冒頭で触れているthe
great debateというのは、スミソニアン博物館でのエノラ・ゲイ展示騒動(1995年)を指しているようです。ご参考まで。--KK
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Re the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Jim
Auer and I
did a piece for Parameters (USArmy War College professional
journal) just after the great debate of 1995 on whether the bombings
were justified. Our conclusion is in the opening paragraphs and any
reader who wishes to pursue the rest of it can find it at http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96spring/sp-essay.htm#Auer
Looking
Back at the Bomb JAMES E. AUER and RICHARD
HALLORAN
The great debate
over the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki that swept across America
last summer was partly
emotional and even trivial but mainly genuine and
profound. The
50th anniversary of the bombings generated at least nine
books, a
packet of magazine articles, radio commentaries, television shows,
reminiscences by Americans who attacked and Japanese who were
victims.
If it had not been for the O. J. Simpson trial, the atomic
issue might have
dominated national attention.
The deliberations have subsided, but that
does not mean the issues
have gone away or a consensus has been reached. The
fundamental question remains: Was the United States justified in
dropping two bombs that immediately killed 200,000 people, the
vast
majority of them civilians? More simply, was President Truman
right or
wrong?
After studying much of the literature, we have concluded that the
United States was justified and President Truman was right. We
also
believe that, like most human endeavors, it could have been
handled better;
the atomic bombing of Nagasaki so soon after
Hiroshima is rightly open to
question. Lastly, we recognize that,
again as with most human endeavors,
reasonable men and women
will differ.
Sifting through this mass of
material, it seems evident that Japan
had been defeated by late July 1945,
and that some Japanese
leaders realized this. But defeat and surrender are
not the same,
and the issue was how to get Japan, notably the militarists
who
ruled the nation, to quit. In this, President Truman appeared to have
six options:
a.. Invade Japan in two stages, prolonging the war for
a year and
taking large numbers of American and Allied casualties.*
b..
Continue the aerial bombing and naval blockade until the
Japanese lost the
will to resist and surrendered. c.. Get the
Russians into the war in the
hope they would crack Japanese
resolve and make them sue for peace. d..
Accept Japan's
proposals to negotiate by modifying the demand for an
unconditional surrender to permit Japan to retain the Emperor, a
vital
point to the Japanese, and agreeing to a minimal occupation of
Japan. e..
Warn that atomic bombs would be used unless Japan
surrendered, and possibly
detonate one as a demonstration. f..
Drop the atomic bombs to shock the
Japanese into quitting before
more devastation was loosed on their
nation.
Each option was considered, some more thoroughly than others,
between 12 April when Mr. Truman became President and 24 July
when he
approved an order to drop the bombs after 3 August 1945.
It was not a
methodical process--government then was no more
neat and orderly than it is
today--but the decision was taken after
three and a half years of a brutal,
draining, desperate war.
* I heard, after the article had appeared, a
vignette that underscored
the large number of casualties expected had the US
invaded
Japan. The armed forces minted enough Purple Hearts to award a
medal to everyone killed or wounded in action. They made so many
that
no new medals were needed all through the Korean War,
Vietnam, and
skirmishes up to the Gulf War of 1991. The last of the
WWII Purple Hearts
was awarded to a Marine wounded in Desert
Storm.