ＥＥＥ会議（余談：日米同盟の行方は？）.................................................................2003.8.31
いよいよ本格的な（？）残暑お見舞いを申し上げます。
さて、エネルギー、原子力関係ばかり論じていても視野が狭くなりますので、時々
「余談」と称していろいろなテーマをご紹介しているわけですが、目下内外の論壇で
は、北朝鮮核問題などの影響で、日米同盟関係は将来どうなるか、日本自身の安全保
障・国防政策はどういう方向に進むのか、日本は核武装すべきなのか、というような
テーマが盛んに議論されております。
次にご紹介するのはインドの国際問題専門家がWORLD
POLICY JOURNAL （SUMMER
2003）に発表したRajan Menon, "The End of
Alliances"（同盟関係の終焉）と題す
る論文で、要点を簡単にまとめるとーー
（１）在韓米軍が撤収すれば日本が東アジアで唯一の米軍基地になるが、それを日本
人が引き続き受け入れるかどうか。それ以上に、ワシントンが米軍の日本駐留を継続
するかどうか極めて疑問。ＮＡＴＯと同じく、日米同盟もいずれ解消の方向に進まざ
るを得ないだろう。
（２）その際の
日本の選択肢としては、自力国防のための軍事力強化（軍拡路線）
以外にないと思われるが、一体どこの国の脅威から日本を守るのか、新たにどこかの
国（国々）と同盟関係を結ぶのか？ 東アジアで軍拡競争を誘発する危険性は？
（３）日本の軍事力強化は財政的、技術的には問題ないが、そもそもその政治的意思
が国内にあるかどうか、海外の日本軍国主義復活の懸念にどう応えるか？ 東アジア
諸国を刺激しない「ほどほどの軍事力」とは？
というような疑問を提出しており、いずれも誠にご尤もですが、明快な答えが中々出
ないのが厄介なところです。インド人の分析だけに、比較的に中立的で、一応議論の
枠組みにはなると思いますので、関心のある方は、次のサイトで全文をご覧下さい。
次に一部を抜粋しておきます。 ご参考まで。--KK
************************************
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-2/menon.html
The
End of Alliances (日本関係部分のみ）
If the United States military were to leave
Korea, Japan would be
the only Asia-Pacific country hosting a major network
of American
bases...........One possibility is that Japan might cling to the
United
States .......... Alternatively, Japan might not want to be the
sole
remaining platform for American power in East Asia and,
having
witnessed the transience of alliances, prepare to defend itself on
its
own.
[..........]
However rock solid the U.S.- Japan
alliance now seems to be, it
is not immune to the winds of change. Owing to
shifts in the East
Asian balance of power, Japan could choose-or be forced-to
protect
its long-term interests either independently or in cooperation
with
the United States, but without a formal alliance or American bases
on
its territory. .......... There is a range of strategic options available
to
Japan between the extremes of relying entirely on American
protection, while
retaining an anemic military force, and embarking
on an unrestrained arms
buildup that culminates in a replay of
the 1930s and
1940s
[..........]
Japan's military potential is not limited by a
lack of wealth or
technical know-how, ...... The chief impediment is
political-lack of
support at home, fear of a militarily powerful Japan
abroad. This is
not a minor consideration, but, in the end, Japan will not
defy the
iron logic of a world where threats abound and selfhelp
is
consequently the only dependable
option.
[..........]
Changes in Japan's defense policy will create
a radically different
setting for the U.S.-Japan alliance. It has not
suddenly become
irrelevant, but its purposes are much less clear: Who is
the
adversary? What is the nature of the new common threats? How
can the
alliance deal with them? What new obligations must each
partner
undertake?
[..........]
Many ideas have been advanced-by Americans
and Japanese-to
ensure the alliance's continued relevancy and
resilience.
But, in one form or another, they involve extending its
geographical
scope to unstable areas beyond Northeast Asia, and
consequently
are received warily both in Japan and in neighboring
ountries
........... a key requirement for new missions is that they
keep Japan's
military power within "safe" limits. One way forward is
cooperation between
the United States and Japan
on "comprehensive security," which broadens the
definition
of security, downplays the military element, .......... . But why
do
they require a military alliance to do so?
[..........]
The
value of the alliance will also be assessed more stringently by
Washington in
the post-Cold War era. .......... . It is a safe bet .......
that the
continued deployment of 46,000 troops and substantial air,
ground, and naval
assets in the Japanese archipelago will, in time,
appear infeasible and
imprudent.
[..........]
The axiom that the United States must
eternally hold a security
umbrella over Japan will become steadily less
compelling as new
circumstances arise.
[.........]