ＥＥＥ会議（米国の対北朝鮮戦略の転換？）......................................................2003.9.6


米国ブッシュ政権の対北朝鮮政策は、大統領選挙戦が事実上開始したこともあり、ひ
ところのような強引さは影をひそめ、相手の出方を見極めつつ「段階的に」じっくり
対応して行くという態度に変わってきており、そのことは先般の北京での６ヶ国協議
でも窺われるところです。問題は米国がどのような段階的アプローチを考えているか
で、New York Timesの著名記者は次のように分析しています。　ご参考まで。
--KK
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U.S. Said to Shift Approach in Talks With North Korea
By DAVID E. SANGER


WASHINGTON, Sept. 4 ・President Bush, in a significant shift in his approach
to North Korea, authorized American negotiators to say last week that he is
prepared to take a range of steps to aid the starving nation ・from
gradually easing sanctions to an eventual peace treaty, senior officials
today.

But, officials emphasized, these inducements would be phased in slowly only
as North Korea starts surrendering its nuclear weapons, dismantling the
facilities used to develop them and permitting inspectors free run of the
country.

The proposals were described to the North Koreans at the talks, which were
held in Beijing last week. They constituted a major departure from the
official White House statements earlier this year that North Korea would see
no benefits from a new relationship until it shipped all its weapons out of
the country and dismantled all of its nuclear facilities.

The North Koreans did not immediately respond to the new approach, but
American officials said they would continue to follow the strategy in future
talks, which they expect will resume in October.

In adopting the new strategy, the White House apparently acceded to some of
the arguments from within the State Department, and from allies like South
Korea, that the talks would break down if Washington could not describe some
vision of how relations could improve.

In a brief telephone conversation this evening, Mr. Bush's national security
adviser, Condoleezza Rice, disputed the notion that Mr. Bush was making a
significant change in strategy. She emphasized that any major benefits to
North Korea would come only after it could no longer pose a nuclear threat
or rebuild its nuclear capacity.

In the past, Ms. Rice has criticized the Clinton administration's 1994
nuclear freeze agreement with North Korea for giving the country fuel oil
before it dismantled anything.

But she and other officials said that Mr. Bush was presented with the new
negotiating strategy at his ranch in Texas last month, and approved the
specifics after a meeting of his senior national security aides in late
August.

"We're going to give these talks a real chance," Ms. Rice said. "This is the
best opportunity for getting a resolution for a long time." But she quickly
added that "a lot depends on North Korean behavior."

The latter remark was a clear reference to North Korea's threat, delivered
at the talks last week, to conduct a nuclear test and its past threats to
make its supplies of plutonium available to the highest bidder. In the past,
Mr. Bush has called such comments "blackmail."

The crucial change in the approach at the Beijing talks was in providing for
a sequence of rewards to North Korea, according to a State Department
official who spoke to reporters today and other officials.

Late last year, the White House publicly dismissed the notion that North
Korea would see any benefits before its entire nuclear infrastructure was
eliminated. But even then, a behind-the-scenes struggle was playing out
between State Department officials who favored offering some rewards to the
North Koreans for intermediate steps and hard-liners in the Pentagon and the
vice president's office.

That struggle continued, and officials said the parties were fully engaged
in it up to the time the negotiators, led by James A. Kelly, the assistant
secretary of state for East Asian affairs, left for Beijing.

But the senior State Department official said today that that "we made clear
that we are not seeking to strangle North Korea," and the negotiators said
"we are willing to discuss a sequence of denuclearization measures with
corresponding measures on the part of both sides."

That approach, dubbed "more for more," has long been advocated by the deputy
secretary of state, Richard L. Armitage. But it has been opposed by
hard-liners who believe that no agreement with North Korea can ever be
trusted, and that it will never give up all aspects of its nuclear program.

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