ＥＥＥ会議（イランのアザデガン油田開発問題の行方？）...........................................2003.9.6


日本の将来のエネルギー安全保障上も極めて重要な影響をもつイランのアザデガン油
田開発問題については、イランの核開発を阻止したい米国政府の強いプレッシャー
で、日本企業による契約調印は相変わらず難航しております（本件についてはＥＥＥ
会議でも７、８月に再三お伝えしました）。先週訪日したイランのKharrazi外務大臣
は、平沼経済産業大臣等との会談で、ＩＡＥＡ追加議定書加入に前向きの姿勢を示唆
したものとみられ、もし実際にそうなれば事態は好転する可能性がありますが、果た
してそう順調に進むかどうか予断を許しません。イランはすでに核兵器とミサイル技
術を入手済みで、追加議定書を受け入れてもＩＡＥＡ査察から隠し切れると判断して
いる、という見方もあります。Asia Times紙（9/4)の記事"Japan's Iranian oil
dilemma"をご紹介します。抜粋で、全文は　
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EI04Dh01.html　でどうぞ。
--KK

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Japan's Iranian oil dilemma

By Jamie Miyazaki

The last time a senior Iranian delegation had breezed through
Tokyo, back in 2000, the Japanese felt rightly smug at the results of
their diplomatic efforts. A cool US$3 billion credit line to the hard-up
Islamic Republic had secured Tokyo preferential rights to the
massive 26-billion-barrel Azadegan oilfield. Coming hot on the heels
of Saudi Arabia's cancellation of Japan's oil concession at Al Khafji,
Azadegan represented a major coup for Japan's Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), entrusted with the task of
securing Japan's energy security.

However, this was all before September 11, 2001, and US President
George W Bush's later infamous "axis of evil" speech. Since then
the strategic landscape of energy politics and the Middle East has
changed beneath METI's feet. Recent revelations of Iranian nuclear
ambitions have strengthened the hand of Washington's neo-cons in
adopting a more antagonistic approach to dealing with Tehran's
mullahs. All this has caught Tokyo on the back foot as it seeks to
maintain a workable strategic balance between its key ally, the
United States, and guaranteeing an uninterrupted supply of oil.

Back in June 2001, Japanese trade minister Takeo Hiranuma
announced that "Japan is not affected by US pressure" after signing
a letter of intent to develop the Azadegan oilfield. Since then, US
pressure has evidently risen a few notches. This summer National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage summoned Ryozu  Kato, the Japanese
ambassador to Washington, to make clear US displeasure at an
Azadegan deal as long as Iran was pursuing a covert nuclear-
weapons program. Expiration of the June deadline formally to ink
the deal to develop Japan's Azadegan concession slipped by, to the
discomfort of both Tokyo and Tehran (see "Americans stymie Japan-
Iran oil deal," July 4).�

Washington meanwhile demanded that Iran sign the International
Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol allowing rigorous
inspection by IAEA officials, which put further pressure on Tokyo.
Iran responded by upping the ante with the unconfirmed discovery of
a 38-billion-barrel oilfield and hinting that it would enter into talks
with Chinese and Russian consortia in Japan's place.

With energy tussles with the Chinese already under way in Siberia
over Russian oil, alarm bells started ringing in Tokyo as its attempts
at separating the Azadegan and nuclear issues looked set to
implode. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi's visit to Japan
last week was thus a vital opportunity for Tokyo to find a way of
resolving the crisis.

Japanese efforts look to have worked, for the moment at least.
Kharrazi confirmed Iranian willingness to sign the IAEA's Additional
Protocol and METI's ne w energy strategy with Azadegan at its
center has been vindicated. However, the crisis has brought into
focus again Japan's precarious energy security. [...]

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