ＥＥＥ会議（米国の原子力発電所の安全保障対策：ＧＡＯ報告書）....................................2003.9.27
米国で、政府関係機関の活動内容をチェックする会計検査院（General
Accounting
Office=GAO、 米議会に属し、日本の会計検査院より広範な権限を持つ）は、一昨日
(9/25）公表した報告書の中で、現在全米で稼動中の１０４基の商業炉については安
全保障（とくにテロ攻撃からの防護）の面でまだまだ改善すべき重要な点が多数ある
にもかかわらず、原子力規制委員会(NRC)は、この点について十分な監督機能を果た
していない、という趣旨の厳しい指摘を行っております。国務省発表のプレスリリー
スをお目にかけます。 小生時間不足のため詳細を確認できませんので、どなたか調
査・確認してＥＥＥ会議で皆様に報告してくだされば幸いです。
--KK
**********************************************
Date:
Fri, 26 Sep 2003 19:45:01 -0400
Subject: Text: GAO Report Finds Weaknesses
in U.S. Nuclear Plant Security
(Congressional auditors
recommend strengthening
force-on-force
exercises)
A
new report says that while the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
has
taken numerous actions to respond to the heightened risk of terrorist
attack
at the nation's 104 nuclear power plants, serious weaknesses still
exist in
NRC's oversight of security at the civilian nuclear reactors.
A report
released September 24 by the General Accounting Office (GAO) --
the
investigative arm of Congress -- recommends that the NRC improve
its
oversight at commercial nuclear power plants by "promptly restoring
annual
security inspections" and strengthening so-called force-on-force
exercises
that demonstrate how well a nuclear plant might be defended against
a
real-life threat.
The GAO report detailed weaknesses in several
aspects of the commission's
security inspection program. For example, the
report said NRC inspectors
often used a process that minimized the
significance of security problems
found in annual inspections by classifying
them as "non-cited violations"
-- a type of violation that does not require
NRC inspectors to later
verify that a problem has been corrected.
For
example, GAO found that guards at one plant failed to physically
search
several individuals for metal objects after a walk-through detector
and a
hand-held scanner detected metal objects in their clothing. The
unchecked
individuals were then allowed unescorted access throughout the
plant's
protected area.
GAO also reported several weaknesses in NRC's
force-on-force exercises,
including using more personnel to defend the plant
during these exercises
than are available on a normal day, using attacking
forces that are not
trained in terrorist tactics, and using unrealistic
weapons -- rubber guns
-- that do not simulate actual gunfire.
The
report said that even if NRC strengthens its inspection program,
commercial
nuclear power plants face legal challenges in ensuring plant
security. For
example, federal law generally prohibits guards at these
plants from using
automatic weapons, although terrorists are likely to
have them.
The
entire report, entitled "Oversight of Security at Commercial Nuclear
Power
Plants Needs to be Strengthened," can be found at the following Web
site: http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-752
Following
is the text of the report's highlights:
(begin text)
General
Accounting Office
September 24, 2003
Oversight of Security at
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to be
Strengthened
NRC has taken
numerous actions to respond to the heightened risk of
terrorist attack,
including interacting with the Department of Homeland
Security and issuing
orders designed to increase security and improve
plant defensive barriers.
However, three aspects of its security
inspection program reduced NRC's
effectiveness in overseeing security at
commercial nuclear power
plants.
First, NRC inspectors often used a process that minimized the
significance
of security problems found in annual inspections by classifying
them as
"non-cited violations" if the problem had not been identified
frequently
in the past or if the problem had no direct, immediate,
adverse
consequences at the time it was identified. Non-cited violations do
not
require a written response from the licensee and do not require
NRC
inspectors to verify that the problem has been corrected. For
example,
guards at one plant failed to physically search several individuals
for
metal objects after a walk-through detector and a hand-held
scanner
detected metal objects in their clothing. The unchecked individuals
were
then allowed unescorted access throughout the plant's protected area.
By
making extensive use of non-cited violations for serious problems, NRC
may
overstate the level of security at a power plant and reduce the
likelihood
that needed improvements are made.
Second, NRC does not
have a routine, centralized process for collecting,
analyzing, and
disseminating security inspections to identify problems
that may be common to
plants or to provide lessons learned in resolving
security problems. Such a
mechanism may help plants improve their
security.
Third, although
NRC's force-on-force exercises can demonstrate how well a
nuclear plant might
defend against a real-life threat, several weaknesses
in how NRC conducted
these exercises limited their usefulness. Weaknesses
included using (1) more
personnel to defend the plant during these
exercises than during a normal
day, (2) attacking forces that are not
trained in terrorist tactics, and (3)
unrealistic weapons (rubber guns)
that do not simulate actual gunfire.
Furthermore, NRC has made only
limited use of some available improvements
that would make force-on-force
exercises more realistic and provide a more
useful learning experience.
Even if NRC strengthens its inspection
program, commercial nuclear power
plants face legal challenges in ensuring
plant security. First, federal
law generally prohibits guards at these plants
from using automatic
weapons, although terrorists are likely to have them. As
a result, guards
at commercial nuclear power plants could be at a
disadvantage in
firepower, if attacked. Second, state laws vary regarding the
permissible
use of deadly force and the authority to arrest and detain
intruders, and
guards are unsure about the extent of their authorities and
may hesitate
or fail to act if the plant is attacked.
Why GAO Did This
Study
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks intensified the nation's
focus
on national preparedness and homeland security. Among possible
terrorist
targets are the nation's nuclear power plants・04 facilities
containing
radioactive fuel and waste. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC)
oversees plant security through an inspection program designed to
verify
the plants' compliance with security requirements. As part of
that
program, NRC conducted annual security inspections of plants
and
force-on-force exercises to test plant security against a
simulated
terrorist attack. GAO was asked to review (1) the effectiveness of
NRC's
security inspection program and (2) legal challenges affecting power
plant
security. Currently, NRC is reevaluating its inspection program. We
did
not assess the adequacy of security at the individual plants; rather,
our
focus was on NRC's oversight and regulation of plant
security.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to
strengthen NRC's oversight at commercial
nuclear power plants by promptly
restoring annual security inspections and
revising force-on-force exercises.
NRC disagreed with many of GAO's
findings, but did not comment on GAO's
recommendations. GAO continues to
believe its findings are appropriate and
the recommendations need to be
acted upon. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-752.
To view the full
product, including the scope and methodology, click on the
link above.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International
Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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