ＥＥＥ会議（Ｒｅ：イスラエルの核戦略に変化？）................................................................031017

先日(10/9)のメール（石油危機と第４次中東戦争：　核兵器は使用される寸前だった
！）で、イスラエルの核抑止力問題について論じたばかりですが、このところ、イラ
ンの核問題との関連で、再びイスラエルの核兵器使用の可能性が各方面で盛んに取り
沙汰されております。つまり、30年前の第4次中東戦争（Yom Kippur戦争）や12年前
の湾岸戦争の際にも、イスラエルはなんとか核使用を思いとどまり、以来、核に関し
ては「戦略的曖昧さ」を維持してきましたが、最近Los Angels Timesのスクープによ
れば、イスラエルのSharon政権は、核弾頭を装着可能な巡航ミサイル「ハープ―ン」
（潜水艦発射、海対海型）を米国から購入し、海対陸型の長距離ミサイルに改造する
計画を進めている由。英紙Financial Timesでも同趣旨の報道があり、さらにドイツ
誌Der Spiegelによれば、イスラエルはイランの原子力施設に対し空爆を敢行する可
能性がある由。そうなると、イスラエルに対する国際世論の硬化を招き、かえって中
東の核拡散を助長することになるから不利である、というのがこの論者の主張です
（10/14 イスラエル紙Haaretz掲載）。

イスラエルは1981年6月にも、イラクの原子力研究所を突如空爆して世界を驚かせま
したが、今回の相手はイランで、周囲の状況も遥かに複雑になっており、そんなに簡
単に行くとは思えません。なにやら中東情勢も大分きな臭くなってきたような感じで
す。
--KK

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Nuclear neighborhood bully

By Reuven Pedatzur


The effectiveness and success of Israel's nuclear policy could be attributed
to the high degree of responsibility and restraint exhibited by decision
makers, even at times when the state faced threats that were deemed
existential in nature.

  Even at the start of the Yom Kippur War, when Moshe Dayan feared for
Israel's fate and considered ordering the army to arm the doomsday systems,
this was done modestly and without fanfare or proclamations. To Prime
Minister Golda Meir's credit, she immediately ordered Dayan to "forget" the
idea of activating the nuclear arsenal, which further contributed to the
image of a nuclearly responsible Israel. Similarly, in the
Gulf War, when, according to foreign sources, Israel weighed the idea of
using nonconventional weapons, the prime minister and his senior ministers
maintained restraint and did not issue any open threats.

The advantages of this policy, called "nuclear ambiguity," were numerous.
Deterrence was attained without any need to openly threaten the use of
weapons whose existence Israel has never acknowledged; American and
international sanctions, which would have been imposed had Israel openly
declared the existence of nuclear arms or conducted nuclear tests, were
sidestepped; Israel was seen around the world as being a responsible state,
with levelheaded leadership - this prevented the exertion of pressure on
Israel to disarm, as is the case for Iran and North Korea.

Nevertheless, the Sharon government has in recent months seemed to be
stretching the envelope of its militant policy in the war against the
Palestinians, as reflected by the air strike in Syria. The policy envelope
has been stretched to include the nuclear realm, as well. Although only
hinted at, of course, the nuclear threat has become an increasingly
legitimate device employed by Israeli decision makers. This is not only a
mistake; it is liable to erode the successes of the time-honored nuclear
policy. Not only does increased use of the threat not contribute to
deterrence, it testifies to a lack of good judgment and a dangerous
predisposition for panic. Regrettably, those issuing the threats do not
understand the critical difference between threatening the deployment of
conventional military force and crossing the threshold and making nuclear
threats.

So when Minister Avigdor Lieberman threatens to bomb the Aswan Dam and the
prime minister fails to admonish him, Israel's image as a state with
sensible leadership is further eroded. On the eve of the war in Iraq, thick
hints were again leaked about Israel's nuclear potential. The
intention was to strengthen Israel's deterrent capacity, but in essence it
was an admission that the Israeli leadership is not able to withstand even
the most minimal threat of Iraqi nonconventional warfare, even though the
probability of their making good on the threat was practically nil. In the
end, use of the nuclear threat did serious harm to Israel's image of
deterrence, as it was obvious that its leadership lacked self-confidence and
was not demonstrating the steadfastness that is the requisite basis for the
success of any deterrence.

The latest leak, to The Los Angeles Times, should be judged against this
background. The report alleges that Israel has adapted American-made cruise
missiles to carry nuclear warheads that would be launched by submarine.
According to the report, the "Harpoon" missiles, which are designed for
sea-to-sea warfare, have been converted for use as nuclear-tipped missiles
with a long-range sea-to-land capacity. Of course, this is not the first
leak about the building of an Israeli "second-strike capacity" through the
use of Dolphin-class submarines. That same day, the
German weekly Der Spiegel published a report that Israel plans to launch an
air-force attack on Iran's nuclear sites.

Is this an Israeli attempt to put pressure on Iran by trying to frighten it?
If so, it is misguided. It is obvious that Iran will not liquidate its
nuclear program merely because its leaders suddenly hear that Israel has
nuclear missiles aboard its submarines. The only chance of the Iranians
abandoning their development of nuclear arms is through international
pressure, led by the United States. In fact, leaks about Israel's nuclear
capability and a threatened attack on Iran's nuclear facilities hurt the
chances of this scenario unfolding. The leaks only serve to provide the
Iranians with the best argument of all: Why should they stop their nuclear
program when another state in the Middle East has nuclear arms and is
threatening to attack Iran?  First deal with Israel's nuclear facilities,
which are not under international supervision, the Iranians will say.

Our decision makers are inclined to believe that presenting Israel as a
"lunatic state" will help deter its enemies. This is almost certainly not
true in the face of conventional threats, but it does real harm when one
moves into the nuclear realm. Anyone who believes that making Israel the
nuclear neighborhood bully will strengthen its image of deterrence is liable
to find that it could do lethal harm to its nuclear deterrence, weaken its
international status, and invite pressure on itself in the nuclear realm.