ＥＥＥ会議（「良い原子力と悪い原子力」：米国の大物専門家達による新核不拡散構想）.............031223


北朝鮮、イラン、イラク、リビア等々「ならずもの国家」(rogue States)問題が一気
に表面化し、核不不拡散条約（ＮＰＴ）体制が根底から揺らぎつつある中で、つい
に---というか、やっと---米国の核・原子力問題の権威者たちが新構想を打ち出しま
した。　パパ・ブッシュ政権とクリントン政権時代に国務・国防長官、副長官、次官
等を歴任した核問題の大物専門家４名が連名で、本日付けのNew York Times紙上で、
重要な提案を発表しました。

簡単に言えば、ＮＰＴ第４条で保障された原子力平和利用活動を非核兵器国に引き続
き認めつつ、今後の核拡散を阻止するためには、�@非核兵器国による通常の原子力発
電活動を行なう権利と、�A再処理、濃縮などの核燃料サイクル活動を行なう権利の間
に線を引き、�@は認めるが�Aは認めないことにすべきだ、また、�Aを諦めて�@だけを
する国には核燃料の供給保証を与える、という構想です。

ご承知のように、日本のような非核兵器国で、米国、英国、フランス、カナダ、オー
ストラリア等から天然ウランや濃縮サービスを購入する国の場合は、これら諸国との
２国間原子力協定により、再処理、濃縮（２０％以上）などは事前同意の対象になっ
ており厳しく規制されておりますが、こうした２国間協定を結ばないで、勝手に原子
力開発をしている一部の途上国（ＮＰＴ非加盟国や「ならず者国家」）が存在するか
らこそ、核拡散問題が生ずるわけです。つまり、そもそもＮＰＴ上は核燃料サイクル
活動が禁止されておらずーーＩＡＥＡの査察・保障措置を受けさせすればーー自由に
出来る形になっているから、こういう問題が実際に起こるのです。ここにＮＰＴの最
大の欠陥があることは言うまでもありません。

だから、遅ればせながら今からでも、核燃料サイクル活動を全面的に禁止するような
国際レジームを作ろう、そうしてＮＰＴを補強しようしようというのが４氏の狙いで
す。これは、原子力発電活動自体が悪いのではなく、核燃料サイクル活動が悪いのだ
という発想で、我々日本人の感覚からすれば、今ごろになって何を言っているのかと
いう感じですが、核兵器国もやっと問題の本質にメスを入れようとしているわけで
す。ＮＰＴを改正するとなると手続きが大変だから、同条約とは別の合意文書を作る
べきだということも提案しています。

このような提案が簡単に世界各国の支持を得るとは思えませんが、この時期に米国の
第一級の権威者たちがこういう提案を打ち出したことは注目に値します。日本として
も今後の成り行きを注視する必要があります。

なお、この４氏連名の論文は非常に重要なので、いずれ関係省庁かJNC、原産あたり
が翻訳するでしょうが、ＥＥＥ会議の会員でどなたか全訳（または正確な抄訳）を
作ってくだされば幸甚です。小生は目下時間的余裕がありませんので。
--KK

*********************************************

Good Nukes, Bad Nukes
By ASHTON B. CARTER, ARNOLD KANTER, WILLIAM J. PERRY and BRENT SCOWCROFT

Published: December 22, 2003

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is arguably the most popular treaty in
history: except for five states, every nation in the world is part of it.
For more than three decades, it has helped curb the spread of nuclear
weapons.

Since 9/11, however, and especially in the last several months, the
viability of the treaty has been called into question. Some say it is
obsolete. Others say it is merely ineffective. In support of its argument
each side cites the situation in Iran, which has been able to advance a
nuclear weapons program despite being a member of the treaty.

The Iranian nuclear program ? and, to a lesser extent, the activities of
Libya, which has also signed the treaty but announced last week it would
give up all illegal weapons programs ? highlight both the utility and the
limitations of the treaty. It is not obsolete; if the treaty did not exist,
we almost certainly would want to invent it. At the same time, it would be a
mistake to rely on it exclusively to address the problem of nuclear
proliferation.

Those who say the treaty is useless argue that the bad guys either don't
sign the treaty, or they do and then cheat. The good guys sign and obey, but
the treaty is irrelevant for these countries because they have no intention
of becoming nuclear proliferators in the first place.

This all-or-nothing argument is wrong. First, it fails to acknowledge that
there is an important category in between good guys and bad guys. For these
in-betweens ? countries like Ukraine, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Argentina or
South Korea ? the weight of international opinion against proliferation
expressed in the treaty has contributed to tipping the balance of
decision-making against having nuclear weapons.

Second, the treaty does have an impact even on "bad guys" like Iraq, Iran
and North Korea. When the United States moves against such regimes, it does
so with the support of the global opprobrium for nuclear weapons that the
treaty enshrines.

This consensus undergirds the multilateral approach that is under way to
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, and was at the heart of the
international pressure that persuaded Tehran to increase the transparency of
its nuclear program. Even in the divisive case of Iraq, no one argued that
Saddam Hussein should be left alone with weapons of mass destruction.

Yet the treaty is not perfect. It allows, for example, nations that forswear
nuclear weapons to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Signatories
may build and operate nuclear power reactors, and they are permitted to
produce enriched uranium that fuels the reactors, to store the radioactive
spent fuel from those reactors, and to reprocess that spent fuel. The only
specific obligations are that signatories declare these plants to the
International Atomic Energy Agency and permit the agency to inspect them.

The problem is that this "closed fuel cycle" gives these countries the
inherent capacity to produce the fissile material required for a nuclear
weapon. Facilities used to produce enriched uranium for power reactors can
also be used to produce enriched uranium for weapons. Reprocessing spent
fuel yields plutonium that can be fashioned into nuclear weapons.

As North Korea and Iran demonstrate, regimes that intend to violate the
treaty's ban on nuclear weapons can exploit this right to operate a nuclear
power plant. While seeming to remain within the terms of the treaty, they
can gather all the resources necessary to make nuclear weapons. Then they
can abrogate the treaty and proceed to build a nuclear arsenal.

The world should renew its determination to curb the spread of nuclear
weapons by supplementing the current treaty with additional inducements and
penalties. The key is to draw a distinction between the right to a peaceful
civilian nuclear power program and the right to operate a closed fuel cycle.
The first should be preserved ? and perhaps enhanced ? but the second should
be seriously discouraged, if not prohibited.

How might such a system work? In addition to their treaty obligations, those
countries seeking to develop nuclear power to generate electricity would
agree not to manufacture, store or reprocess nuclear fuel. They also would
agree to submit to inspections (probably under the atomic energy agency) to
verify their compliance.

Those countries that now sell peaceful nuclear technology in accordance with
the treaty, meanwhile, would agree not to provide technology, equipment or
fuel for nuclear reactors and related facilities to any country that will
not renounce its right to enrich and reprocess nuclear fuel, and agree not
to sell or transfer any equipment or technology designed for the enrichment
or reprocessing of nuclear fuel. At the same time, these countries would
agree to guarantee the reliable supply of nuclear fuel, and retrieval of
spent fuel at competitive prices, to those countries that do agree to this
new arrangement.

We might also consider sanctions on those countries that nevertheless choose
to pursue a closed fuel cycle. Whatever the precise content and form of
these undertakings, it would probably be better to treat them as a companion
to that treaty, rather than embark on the complicated and controversial
process of amending it.

Why would any countries that want to develop a peaceful nuclear power
program agree to such a bargain? One blunt answer is that if these
restrictions were put in place, these countries would have virtually no
choice, because developing the necessary technology from scratch is a
daunting task. Refusing the arrangement would open them up to international
scrutiny and pressure. On the other hand, any country that was truly
interested in developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes would
undoubtedly welcome a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel.

And why would countries that now supply nuclear technology be interested?
First, no nation in this category has any interest in adding any country to
the roster of the world's nuclear states. Second, over time, there probably
is more money to be made in nuclear fuel services than in nuclear reactors.

Iran provides an excellent opportunity to test this approach. Building on
the progress recently announced in Tehran, the United States should propose
that Russian plans to help Iran build a network of civilian nuclear power
reactors be permitted to proceed ? provided that Iran enters into a
verifiable ban on its enrichment and reprocessing abilities, and into an
agreement to depend instead on a Russian-led suppliers' consortium for
nuclear fuel services.

The Russians would be likely to embrace such a proposal for commercial and
political reasons, and the Iranians would be confronted with a clear test of
whether they harbor nuclear weapons ambitions. Britain, France and Germany,
whose foreign ministers recently proposed a similar scheme to Iran, would
need only to avoid the temptation to undercut the Russians on behalf of
their own nuclear industry. And the United States could reap the benefits of
offering a constructive initiative to address the Iranian nuclear problem.

Of course, this new arrangement would hardly be a cure-all. And making it
work would be difficult. But at a time when its effectiveness and relevance
are being questioned, such an approach would strengthen the treaty by
furthering its goals: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons while
promoting the development of peaceful nuclear energy.


William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter were secretary of defense and
assistant secretary of defense, respectively, in the Clinton administration.
Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter were national security adviser and under
secretary of state, respectively, in the administration of George H. W.
Bush.







北朝鮮、イラン、イラク、リビア等々「ならずもの国家」(rogue States)問題が一気
に表面化し、核不不拡散条約（ＮＰＴ）体制が根底から揺らぎつつある中で、つい
に---というか、やっと---米国の核・原子力問題の権威者たちが新構想を打ち出しま
した。　パパ・ブッシュ政権とクリントン政権時代に国務・国防長官、副長官、次官
等を歴任した核問題の大物専門家４名が連名で、本日付けのNew York Times紙上で、
重要な提案を発表しました。

簡単に言えば、ＮＰＴ第４条で保障された原子力平和利用活動を非核兵器国に引き続
き認めつつ、今後の核拡散を阻止するためには、�@非核兵器国による通常の原子力発
電活動を行なう権利と、�A再処理、濃縮などの核燃料サイクル活動を行なう権利の間
に線を引き、�@は認めるが�Aは認めないことにすべきだ、また、�Aを諦めて�@だけを
する国には核燃料の供給保証を与える、という構想です。

ご承知のように、日本のような非核兵器国で、米国、英国、フランス、カナダ、オー
ストラリア等から天然ウランや濃縮サービスを購入する国の場合は、これら諸国との
２国間原子力協定により、再処理、濃縮（２０％以上）などは事前同意の対象になっ
ており厳しく規制されておりますが、こうした２国間協定を結ばないで、勝手に原子
力開発をしている一部の途上国（ＮＰＴ非加盟国や「ならず者国家」）が存在するか
らこそ、核拡散問題が生ずるわけです。つまり、そもそもＮＰＴ上は核燃料サイクル
活動が禁止されておらずーーＩＡＥＡの査察・保障措置を受けさせすればーー自由に
出来る形になっているから、こういう問題が実際に起こるのです。ここにＮＰＴの最
大の欠陥があることは言うまでもありません。

だから、遅ればせながら今からでも、核燃料サイクル活動を全面的に禁止するような
国際レジームを作ろう、そうしてＮＰＴを補強しようしようというのが４氏の狙いで
す。これは、原子力発電活動自体が悪いのではなく、核燃料サイクル活動が悪いのだ
という発想で、我々日本人の感覚からすれば、今ごろになって何を言っているのかと
いう感じですが、核兵器国もやっと問題の本質にメスを入れようとしているわけで
す。ＮＰＴを改正するとなると手続きが大変だから、同条約とは別の合意文書を作る
べきだということも提案しています。

このような提案が簡単に世界各国の支持を得るとは思えませんが、この時期に米国の
第一級の権威者たちがこういう提案を打ち出したことは注目に値します。日本として
も今後の成り行きを注視する必要があります。

なお、この４氏連名の論文は非常に重要なので、いずれ関係省庁かJNC、原産あたり
が翻訳するでしょうが、ＥＥＥ会議の会員でどなたか全訳（または正確な抄訳）を
作ってくだされば幸甚です。小生は目下時間的余裕がありませんので。
--KK

*********************************************

Good Nukes, Bad Nukes
By ASHTON B. CARTER, ARNOLD KANTER, WILLIAM J. PERRY and BRENT SCOWCROFT

Published: December 22, 2003

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is arguably the most popular treaty in
history: except for five states, every nation in the world is part of it.
For more than three decades, it has helped curb the spread of nuclear
weapons.

Since 9/11, however, and especially in the last several months, the
viability of the treaty has been called into question. Some say it is
obsolete. Others say it is merely ineffective. In support of its argument
each side cites the situation in Iran, which has been able to advance a
nuclear weapons program despite being a member of the treaty.

The Iranian nuclear program ? and, to a lesser extent, the activities of
Libya, which has also signed the treaty but announced last week it would
give up all illegal weapons programs ? highlight both the utility and the
limitations of the treaty. It is not obsolete; if the treaty did not exist,
we almost certainly would want to invent it. At the same time, it would be a
mistake to rely on it exclusively to address the problem of nuclear
proliferation.

Those who say the treaty is useless argue that the bad guys either don't
sign the treaty, or they do and then cheat. The good guys sign and obey, but
the treaty is irrelevant for these countries because they have no intention
of becoming nuclear proliferators in the first place.

This all-or-nothing argument is wrong. First, it fails to acknowledge that
there is an important category in between good guys and bad guys. For these
in-betweens ? countries like Ukraine, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Argentina or
South Korea ? the weight of international opinion against proliferation
expressed in the treaty has contributed to tipping the balance of
decision-making against having nuclear weapons.

Second, the treaty does have an impact even on "bad guys" like Iraq, Iran
and North Korea. When the United States moves against such regimes, it does
so with the support of the global opprobrium for nuclear weapons that the
treaty enshrines.

This consensus undergirds the multilateral approach that is under way to
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, and was at the heart of the
international pressure that persuaded Tehran to increase the transparency of
its nuclear program. Even in the divisive case of Iraq, no one argued that
Saddam Hussein should be left alone with weapons of mass destruction.

Yet the treaty is not perfect. It allows, for example, nations that forswear
nuclear weapons to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Signatories
may build and operate nuclear power reactors, and they are permitted to
produce enriched uranium that fuels the reactors, to store the radioactive
spent fuel from those reactors, and to reprocess that spent fuel. The only
specific obligations are that signatories declare these plants to the
International Atomic Energy Agency and permit the agency to inspect them.

The problem is that this "closed fuel cycle" gives these countries the
inherent capacity to produce the fissile material required for a nuclear
weapon. Facilities used to produce enriched uranium for power reactors can
also be used to produce enriched uranium for weapons. Reprocessing spent
fuel yields plutonium that can be fashioned into nuclear weapons.

As North Korea and Iran demonstrate, regimes that intend to violate the
treaty's ban on nuclear weapons can exploit this right to operate a nuclear
power plant. While seeming to remain within the terms of the treaty, they
can gather all the resources necessary to make nuclear weapons. Then they
can abrogate the treaty and proceed to build a nuclear arsenal.

The world should renew its determination to curb the spread of nuclear
weapons by supplementing the current treaty with additional inducements and
penalties. The key is to draw a distinction between the right to a peaceful
civilian nuclear power program and the right to operate a closed fuel cycle.
The first should be preserved ? and perhaps enhanced ? but the second should
be seriously discouraged, if not prohibited.

How might such a system work? In addition to their treaty obligations, those
countries seeking to develop nuclear power to generate electricity would
agree not to manufacture, store or reprocess nuclear fuel. They also would
agree to submit to inspections (probably under the atomic energy agency) to
verify their compliance.

Those countries that now sell peaceful nuclear technology in accordance with
the treaty, meanwhile, would agree not to provide technology, equipment or
fuel for nuclear reactors and related facilities to any country that will
not renounce its right to enrich and reprocess nuclear fuel, and agree not
to sell or transfer any equipment or technology designed for the enrichment
or reprocessing of nuclear fuel. At the same time, these countries would
agree to guarantee the reliable supply of nuclear fuel, and retrieval of
spent fuel at competitive prices, to those countries that do agree to this
new arrangement.

We might also consider sanctions on those countries that nevertheless choose
to pursue a closed fuel cycle. Whatever the precise content and form of
these undertakings, it would probably be better to treat them as a companion
to that treaty, rather than embark on the complicated and controversial
process of amending it.

Why would any countries that want to develop a peaceful nuclear power
program agree to such a bargain? One blunt answer is that if these
restrictions were put in place, these countries would have virtually no
choice, because developing the necessary technology from scratch is a
daunting task. Refusing the arrangement would open them up to international
scrutiny and pressure. On the other hand, any country that was truly
interested in developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes would
undoubtedly welcome a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel.

And why would countries that now supply nuclear technology be interested?
First, no nation in this category has any interest in adding any country to
the roster of the world's nuclear states. Second, over time, there probably
is more money to be made in nuclear fuel services than in nuclear reactors.

Iran provides an excellent opportunity to test this approach. Building on
the progress recently announced in Tehran, the United States should propose
that Russian plans to help Iran build a network of civilian nuclear power
reactors be permitted to proceed ? provided that Iran enters into a
verifiable ban on its enrichment and reprocessing abilities, and into an
agreement to depend instead on a Russian-led suppliers' consortium for
nuclear fuel services.

The Russians would be likely to embrace such a proposal for commercial and
political reasons, and the Iranians would be confronted with a clear test of
whether they harbor nuclear weapons ambitions. Britain, France and Germany,
whose foreign ministers recently proposed a similar scheme to Iran, would
need only to avoid the temptation to undercut the Russians on behalf of
their own nuclear industry. And the United States could reap the benefits of
offering a constructive initiative to address the Iranian nuclear problem.

Of course, this new arrangement would hardly be a cure-all. And making it
work would be difficult. But at a time when its effectiveness and relevance
are being questioned, such an approach would strengthen the treaty by
furthering its goals: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons while
promoting the development of peaceful nuclear energy.


William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter were secretary of defense and
assistant secretary of defense, respectively, in the Clinton administration.
Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter were national security adviser and under
secretary of state, respectively, in the administration of George H. W.
Bush.