050322  アナン国連事務総長の報告書: 核不拡散問題関係
 
5月2日から開始する第7回NPT再検討会議に先立ち、アナン国連事務総長は「国連創設以来最も包括的な」改革報告書を発表しました。「より一層大きな自由: 万人のための開発、安全保障、人権に向けて」("In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all")と題するこの報告書の第99項に、ウラン濃縮・再処理関連の記述がありますが、これはエルバラダイIAEA事務局長のいわゆる「多国間核管理構想」(MNA)に近い内容と思われます。同報告書全体に関する朝日新聞の報道記事とともにご紹介します。ご参考まで。(本件情報提供者: シグナスX−1氏)
--KK
 
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<第99項>
 
99. The spread of nuclear technology has exacerbated a long-standing tension within the nuclear regime, arising from the simple fact that the technology required for civilian nuclear fuel can also be used to develop nuclear weapons. Measures to mitigate this tension must confront the dangers of nuclear proliferation but must also take into account the important environmental, energy, economic and research applications of nuclear technology. First, the verification authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be strengthened through universal adoption of the Model Additional Protocol. Second, while the access of non-nuclear weapon States to the benefits of nuclear technology should not be curtailed, we should focus on creating incentives for States to voluntarily forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capacities, while guaranteeing their supply of the fuel necessary to develop peaceful uses. One option is an arrangement in which IAEA would act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users at market rates.

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朝日新聞 2005年03月22日(火)

国連安保理拡大を勧告 アナン事務総長、9月までに結論



 国連のアナン事務総長は21日の国連総会で、開発や安全保障、人権、組織改革などを網羅した、国連創設以来最も包括的な改革報告書を発表した。アナン氏はその中で、安全保障理事会の拡大を国連改革に不可欠だとして、加盟国に対し初めて正式に勧告した。国連創設60周年の特別首脳会合が開かれる9月までに結論を出すよう期限を設定し、加盟国の意見がまとまらない場合には、投票による決着を示唆。安保理拡大をめぐり10年以上続く議論は、新しい段階に入ることになった。 
 報告書は、国連憲章前文の一節からとった「一層大きな自由」と題されている。 安保理拡大の方法については、昨年11月に答申が出たA案とB案のうち、どちらを採用すべきかで加盟国の一部が対立している。アナン氏は個別の案を支持することはせず、両案の検討を求めるほか、第三の案を加盟国が協議する可能性にも触れた。改革先送りを避けるため、多数決での決着も示唆した。 
 安全保障の分野でアナン氏は、人道的介入など、武力行使を承認する基準を定めることを提案。紛争後の再建に取り組み、紛争再発を防止するための平和構築委員会の創設を呼びかけた。 また15年を期限とする「ミレニアム開発目標」に絡み、先進国に途上国援助(ODA)の国民総生産(GNP)比を0.7%に引き上げるよう促した。「0.7%」は、安保理入りの資格となる「重要な貢献」の尺度の一つとしても提示した。 
 報告書は人権分野について、現在の国連人権委員会を構成する53カ国のうち、自国の人権侵害を隠すための活動をする国が多く、人権委の信頼性を失墜させたと批判。同委の代わりに「人権理事会」を創設することを提言している。 構成国の数を絞り込み、先進国など人権水準の高い国が選ばれるようにすべきだとの構想だ。 
 このほか、今日の現実が、国連憲章が起草された1945年とは根本的に違うとして憲章の改正にも言及。第2次大戦中に連合国の敵国だった日本、ドイツ、イタリアなどに対して、安保理の承認なしで武力行使ができるなどとした「旧敵国条項」を削除すべきだと訴えた。     
 
◇ 《A案・B案》いずれも安保理の構成国を現在の15から24に増やす。A案は、常任理事国6カ国と非常任理事国3カ国を増加。B案は任期が4年で再選可能な準常任理事国を8カ国新設し、非常任理事国を1カ国加える。いずれも拒否権は与えない。両案ともアフリカ、アジア大洋州、欧州、米州の四つの地域枠を設け、A案の6カ国はアジア大洋州とアフリカに各2、欧州と米州に各1。B案の8カ国は各地域に2ずつ。

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<アナン事務総長の報告書(抜粋)>

In larger freedom:
towards development, security and human rights for all

C. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons

97. Multilateral efforts to bridle the dangers of nuclear technology while harnessing its promise are nearly as old as the United Nations itself. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[12], 35 years old this month, has proved indispensable: it has not only diminished nuclear peril but has also demonstrated the value of multilateral agreements in safeguarding international peace and security. But today, the Treaty has suffered the first withdrawal of a party to the Treaty and faces a crisis of confidence and compliance born of a growing strain on verification and enforcement. The Conference on Disarmament, for its part, faces a crisis of relevance resulting in part from dysfunctional decision-making procedures and the paralysis that accompanies them.

98. Progress in both disarmament and non-proliferation is essential and neither should be held hostage to the other. Recent moves towards disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States should be recognized. Bilateral agreements, including the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, have led to the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear weapons, accompanied by commitments to further sharp reductions in stockpiles. However, the unique status of nuclear-weapon States also entails a unique responsibility, and they must do more, including but not limited to further reductions in their arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and pursuing arms control agreements that entail not just dismantlement but irreversibility. They should also reaffirm their commitment to negative security assurances. Swift negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty is essential. The moratorium on nuclear test explosions must also be upheld until we can achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. I strongly encourage States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to endorse these measures at the 2005 Review Conference.

99. The spread of nuclear technology has exacerbated a long-standing tension within the nuclear regime, arising from the simple fact that the technology required for civilian nuclear fuel can also be used to develop nuclear weapons. Measures to mitigate this tension must confront the dangers of nuclear proliferation but must also take into account the important environmental, energy, economic and research applications of nuclear technology. First, the verification authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be strengthened through universal adoption of the Model Additional Protocol. Second, while the access of non-nuclear weapon States to the benefits of nuclear technology should not be curtailed, we should focus on creating incentives for States to voluntarily forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capacities, while guaranteeing their supply of the fuel necessary to develop peaceful uses. One option is an arrangement in which IAEA would act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users at market rates.

100. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the foundation of the non-proliferation regime, we should welcome recent efforts to supplement it. These include Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), designed to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, technology and materials, and their means of delivery; and the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative, under which more and more States are cooperating to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

101. The availability of ballistic missiles with extended range and greater accuracy is of growing concern to many States, as is the spread of shoulder-fired missiles which could be used by terrorists. Member States should adopt effective national export controls covering missiles and other means of delivery for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, rockets and shoulder-fired missiles, as well as a ban on transferring any of them to non-State actors. The Security Council should also consider adopting a resolution aimed at making it harder for terrorists to acquire or use shoulder-fired missiles.

102. Where progress has been made, it should be consolidated. The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction[13] calls for the complete elimination and destruction of chemical weapons by all States parties, thus offering a historic opportunity to complete a task begun more than a century ago. States parties to the Convention on Chemical Weapons should recommit themselves to achieving the scheduled destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles. I call upon all States to accede immediately to the Convention.

103. The 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction[14] has enjoyed a remarkable degree of support and adherence, and has been strengthened further through recent annual meetings. States parties should consolidate the results of these meetings at the 2006 Review Conference and commit themselves to further measures to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. I also call upon all States to accede immediately to the Convention and to increase the transparency of bio-defence programmes.

104. Further efforts are needed to bolster the biological security regime. The capability of the Secretary-General to investigate suspected use of biological agents, as authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/37, should be strengthened to incorporate the latest technology and expertise; and the Security Council should make use of that capability, consistent with Security Council resolution 620 (1988).

105. Indeed, the Security Council must be better informed on all matters relevant to nuclear, chemical and biological threats. I encourage the Council to regularly invite the Director-General of IAEA and the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to brief the Council on the status of safeguards and verification processes. And I myself stand ready, in consultation with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, to use my powers under Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations to call to the attention of the Security Council any overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease that threatens international peace and security.